Commercial Speech Jurisprudence and Copyright in Commercial Information Works by Yen, Alfred C.
Boston College Law School
Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School
Boston College Law School Faculty Papers
January 2007
Commercial Speech Jurisprudence and Copyright
in Commercial Information Works
Alfred C. Yen
Boston College Law School, alfred.yen@bc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/lsfp
Part of the Legal Education Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Boston
College Law School Faculty Papers by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please
contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Alfred C. Yen. "Commercial Speech Jurisprudence and Copyright in Commercial Information Works." South Carolina Law Review 58,
(2007): 665-682.
HeinOnline -- 58 S. C. L. Rev. 665 2006-2007
COMMERCIAL SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE AND COPYRIGHT 
IN COMMERCIAL INFORMATION WORKS 
ALFRED C. YEN* 
I. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................... 665 
II. COPYRIGHT IN COMMERCIAL INFORMATION WORKS ................................ 668 
A. Originality and Commercial Information Works .............................. 668 
B. The Idea/Expression Dichotomy and Commercial 
Information Works ............................................................................. 671 
TIT. THE FIRST AMENDMENT'S SPECIAL TREATMENT OF 
COMMERCIAL SPEECH ............................................................................... 676 
IV. A COMMERCIAL SPEECH PERSPECTIVE ON COPYRIGHT IN 
COMMERCIAL INFORMATION WORKS ....................................................... 679 
V. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 681 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This Essay uses the First Amendment jurisprudence of commercial speech to 
explain in a partial and preliminary fashion why courts should interpret doctrines 
like originality and the idea/expression dichotomy to limit copyright protection for 
works that convey basic commercial information about goods or services. These 
works, which the Essay calls "commercial information works," include 
advertisements (or at least certain aspects thereof), numbering systems, contracts, 
financial prospectuses, and commercial labels. 
Commercial information works are interesting to study because they differ in 
two ways from the books, music, movies, and other works at the heart of copyright. 
First, commercial information works often present weak cases for copyright 
because they exhibit relatively low levels ofthe originality required for copyright.! 
Insurance policies must accurately portray the commercial terms of the financial 
transactions being promoted, and labels have to depict the commercially significant 
*Professor of Law, Law School Fund Scholar, and Director, Emerging Enterprises and Business 
Law Program, Boston College Law School. Thanks are owed to the editors of the South Carolina Law 
Review for organizing this symposium, to Esther Chang, David Bartholomew, and Kara Hurvitz for 
their research assistance, and to Joe Liu for commenting on an earlier draft. Copyright 2007 by Alfred 
C. Yen. 
I. See 17 U.S.c. § I 02(a) (2000) ("Copyright protection subsists ... in original works of 
authorship .... "); FeistPubl'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Servo Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345-47 (1991) (explaining 
that originality is a prerequisite to copyright). 
665 
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properties ofthe works in question. Authors therefore have fewer choices to make 
when creating these works, making them less expressive than most other works. By 
contrast, the vast majority of books, music, and movies fit comfortably within 
copyright subject matter because they display copious amounts of the originality 
and creativity required for copyright. 
Second, copyright protection for commercial information works frequently is 
problematic from the standpoint of copyright policy. Copyright generally operates 
on the assumption that authors create works for the purpose of selling copies for 
profit. However, people create commercial information works to promote the sale 
of other things, so they do not expect profits from the sale of commercial 
information works. Moreover, commercial information works frequently convey 
information that competitors of the copyright holder will want or even need to 
repeat. Thus a mutual fund company will create a commercial information work (a 
prospectus) to inform potential investors about the salient features of the fund in 
question. A competitor who decides to offer an identical fund will also need its own 
prospectus containing the same information, and that prospectus will necessarily 
resemble closely the first company's prospectus. If copyright allows the first 
company to disrupt the sale ofthe second company's mutual fund shares/ then the 
first company will have gained a competitive advantage unrelated to copyright's 
purpose of encouraging the production of new works.3 
Courts do not agree about how much these observations matter when applying 
copyright to commercial information works. Some courts worry about the 
consequences of copyrighting commercial information works and give them little 
or no protection. Others seem reluctant to distinguish commercial information 
works from other works and grant copyright to commercial information works more 
freely.4 
The First Amendment becomes relevant to copyright in commercial 
information works because copyright restricts free speech. Copyright tells people 
that, in certain situations, they may not freely reproduce or distribute particular 
books, essays, music, or art. 5 Granted, this restriction need not render copyright 
2. This would likely happen through an injunction against distribution of the defendant's 
prospectus, a remedy that would routinely follow a finding of infringement. See Mark A. Lemley & 
Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 
158-65 (1998); see. e.g., LGS Architects, Inc. v. Concordia Homes, 434 F.3d 1150, 1155-57 (9th Cir. 
2006) granting a temporary injunction preventing use of copyrighted building plans where the defendant 
exceeded the scope of the licensing agreement; Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, 387 
F.3d 522, 532-33 (6th Cir. 2004) (vacating a preliminary injuction granted in software copyright 
action); Triad Sys. Corp. v. Se. Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330, 1335 (9th Cir. 1995) (affirming an injuction 
granted in software copyright action). 
3. See Boyle v. Stephens, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 1351, 1998 WL 80175, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 1998) 
(Copyright in plaintiffs prospectus and other materials "does not preclude others from also describing 
such fund characteristics as the availability of individual-specific 'series' and the shifting investment 
composition. Otherwise, plaintiff could prevent competitors from fully describing the mutual fund 
concept in a prospectus or other selling materials-a result the copyright laws do not contemplate."). 
4. See infra Part n. 
5. See 17 U.S.c. § 106 (2000) (defining exclusive rights of copyright holders). 
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inconsistent with the First Amendment. As many courts have noted, the pro-speech 
benefits of appropriately constructed copyright, particularly its stimulation of new 
speech, outweigh the costs associated with its suppression of speech.6 Copyright 
therefore remains constitutional as long as courts interpret it with due regard for the 
First Amendment.7 Failure to interpret copyright this way may not violate the 
Constitution in any given case, but it surely raises the long-term possibility of a 
constitutionally problematic copyright regime that does not serve society's best 
interests. Courts should therefore draw lessons from First Amendment 
jurisprudence when interpreting copyright.8 
As this Essay discusses, the First Amendment can help courts decide whether 
to limit copyright in commercial information works. There are, of course, perfectly 
understandable reasons to grant broad copyright in these works. Modern copyright 
doctrine grants copyright liberally, in part because courts do not want to distinguish 
works on the basis of their aesthetic or creative content.9 Moreover, the basic 
explanation of copyright's constitutionality makes no distinction between various 
types of speech affected by copyright. No one asks whether the encouragement of 
computer programs matters more to the First Amendment than the suppression of 
fine art. It is therefore easy to understand why some courts overlook the distinctive 
characteristics of commercial information works and treat them as if they were 
books, movies, or music. 
However, additional reflection suggests that this practice may not make sense 
if copyright truly takes its interpretive cues from First Amendment jurisprudence. 
Courts may express reluctance to distinguish between various types of speech in 
copyright, but they do the opposite when deciding First Amendment cases. Indeed, 
First Amendment jurisprudence divides speech into a number of constitutionally 
significant categories. Obscenity and fighting words receive no First Amendment 
protection,lO while indecent speech, defamation, and commercial speech receive 
less protection than do most other forms of speech. 11 If courts distinguish between 
various forms of speech in First Amendment cases, perhaps courts should follow 
suit in copyright. 
6. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186,219 (2003) (noting that copyright does not conflict with 
the First Amendment because it encourages new speech); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation 
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558-60 (1985) (noting copyright is an "engine of free expression" and rejecting 
concerns about conflict between copyright and the First Amendment). 
7. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. at 559--60 (explaining how application of doctrines such as fair use 
and the idea/expression dichotomy keep copyright within constitutional limits). 
8. The Supreme Court has recently stated that "it is appropriate to construe copyright's internal 
safeguards to accommodate First Amendment concerns." Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221 n.24. 
9. See FeistPubl'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Servo Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345, 359 (1991) (noting the level 
of creativity needed to support copyright is "extremely low" and copyright's requirement of originality 
"is not particularly stringent"); Bleistein V. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250-52 (1903) 
(stating that courts should not judge the artistic merit of works and suggesting there is no need for 
meaningful assessment of originality). 
10. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,23 (1973) (regarding obscenity); Chaplinsky V. New 
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (regarding fighting words). 
11. See Gertz V. Robert Welch,Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (regarding defamation). 
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The First Amendment jurisprudence of commercial speech is of particular 
interest in this regard because it rests on observations particularly germane to 
copyright. Commercial speech gets First Amendment protection because it plays 
an important role in our market economy. 12 At the same time, however, commercial 
speech does not get full First Amendment protection because existing monetary 
incentives make the production of commercial speech quite likely, even if 
government tries to discourage or suppress it. 13 
When one applies these observations to copyright in commercial information 
works, some interesting insights emerge. First, existing commercial incentives for 
the production and dissemination of commercial speech imply that copyright has 
little effect on the production of commercial speech. Second, the importance of 
accurate commercial signals to our economy implies that those signals should be 
freely disseminated, not restricted by copyright. Together, these insights imply that 
copyright in commercial information works should be carefully limited. 14 
The Essay proceeds in three steps. Part IT quickly summarizes copyright's 
application to works conveying basic commercial information. Part III studies the 
First Amendment jurisprudence of commercial speech. Part IV explains how the 
First Amendment affects the application of copyright to commercial information 
works. Part V concludes with some thoughts about how insights gleaned from the 
First Amendment jurisprudence of commercial speech might affect other parts of 
copyright law. 
IT. COPYRIGHT IN COMMERCIAL INFORMATION WORKS 
Two doctrines, originality and the idea/expression dichotomy, heavily 
influence the application of copyright to commercial information works. This part 
describes how courts interpret these doctrines to reach strikingly different results. 
A. Originality and Commercial Information Works 
Copyright protects a work only if the work exhibits originality.Is The Supreme 
Court has established that the requirement of originality is modest. I6 It is therefore 
fairly easy for most works to gain copyright protection. Nevertheless, copyright 
defendants often argue that commercial information works lack sufficient 
originality to sustain copyright. Courts differ in their responses to this contention. 
12. See infra note 104 and accompanying text. 
13. See infra notes 113-15 and accompanying text. 
14. See Lisa P. Ramsey, Intellectual Property Rights in Advertising, 12 MICH. TELECOMM. & 
TECH. L. REV. 189,2 I 7-23,229-33,246-49 (2006) (noting these characteristics of advertising and 
using them to suggest limiting the scope of copyright in advertisements); Note, Rethinking Copyright 
for Advertisements, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2486, 2490-92, 2501-07 (2006) (noting that advertisements do 
not require copyright incentives to ensure production and suggesting limitations on copyright for 
advertisements on the basis of the useful article doctrine). 
15. See supra note I. 
16. See supra note 9. 
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Sassafras Enterprises, Inc. v. Rashca, Inc.!7 exemplifies cases that have 
interpreted originality to deny copyright to commercial information works. The 
plaintiff, Sassafras, sold pizza stones that came with pamphlets describing the 
stones and giving instructions for use, recipes, and promotional statements touting 
the quality ofthe product and relating the history of bread making.! 8 The defendant, 
Roshco, also sold pizza stones accompanied by pamphlets that resembled those of 
Sassafras. 19 Sassafras objected and sued for, among other things, copyright 
infringement.2o Roshco moved for summary judgment on the issue of copyright 
infringement,2! and the court granted the motion on the ground that Sassafras's 
works lacked sufficient originality.22 According to the court, Sassafras's writing 
about the care and use of its pizza stones "flow[ ed] from the characteristics and 
intended use of the product, not from the imagination of any independent author."23 
Even the recipes and promotional writings touting the quality of the product failed 
to exhibit sufficient originality.24 
Sassafras is a mildly surprising decision, for Sassafras had an entirely plausible 
claim that could easily have survived summary judgment on the issue of 
copyrightability. As has already been noted, leading cases state that the copyright's 
requirement of originality is lenienes The creation of Sassafras's pamphlet surely 
involved at least a small amount of originality, and ajury could easily have found 
in favor of Sassafras. Why then did this not happen? The answer lies in the court's 
understanding of the relationship between Sassafras's reasons for suing and 
copyright policy. 
The court began its copyright analysis by describing the case as one in which 
an established commercial enterprise responded to competition by suing for 
copyright infringement. 26 Later, the court noted that Sassafras did not sue to protect 
incentives provided by copyright.27 The court expressed certainty that Sassafras 
would have produced its pamphlets with or without copyright because commercial 
imperatives and the nature of its product made the pamphlets necessary.28 It 
therefore made little sense to use copyright to protect Sassafras's pamphlets 
because doing so would give Sassafras "an unwarranted economic advantage.,,29 
17. 889 F. Supp. 343 (N.D.l11. 1995). 
18. [d. at 344. 
19. [d. at 344-45. 
20. Id. at 343-44. 
21. Id. at 344. 
22. [d. at 346-47. 
23. [d. at 347. 
24. Id. 
25. See supra note 9. 
26. [d. at 345. 
27. [d. at 346. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. Other cases have denied copyright to connnercial information works on grounds of 
insufficient originality. See Toro Co. v. R & R Products Co., 787 F.2d 1208, 1213 (8th Cir. 1986) 
(holding an arbitrarily designed parts numbering system lacks originality); Alberto-Culver Co. v. 
Andrea Dumon, Inc., 466 F.2d 705, 711 (7th Cir. 1972) (holding that merely descriptive language on 
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By way of contrast, consider the case of AbU, Inc. v. Standard Brands Paint 
Co.30 Tn AbU, the plaintiff sold strings of plastic beads in packages with these 
labels3l : 
~A_~"~~ ~. QUALITY BEADS 
DllAPCt'~;,. IWOM f)W/Dl'RS. ]EWHRY. ACCf-SSD~lfS 
JfJ cuntillUUtJ5 fet:!t uf b1:'ads 
perrlli:HlerIU-" i::Ithl(;heu to nylon cord. 
.,- - .. 1111 not ",n 5,mpl~ ~1'Mt< INSTRucr~II:S1 . ~ ..-- r::1:tt~[I"'W..:JISIl~t!l. ~ 
. ---: LDp ,,,,,.d .nb, <!Y. Ol< 1111I~tri't""" 
Q~E 11I1I'ID DIJfilT1 
T~··. T 
! ! ~ ! 
~ ! i 1 
. ~( ::;I'~' ,_. 11~·'.'''~fll 
:;I'-'~J, 
,-, :,~. " 1'1' 'r: 
~~w- "'<",'I'~ 
~;:~~,,',~h ~-. 7 .' I~R TI~ ~~~·.S _ TA~, At~F>~'.!ln HO: 
II",," ,"',". ""..,.." '"" rm~-I """',- " '." .~H-3' 
The defendant, who sold substantially identical strings ofbeads,32 copied from the 
plaintiffs labels to produce these labels33 : 
product label, including the phrase "most personal sort of deodorant," was uncopyrightable for lack of 
originality). 
30. 323 F. Supp. 1400 (C.D. Cal. 1970). 
31. [d. at 1402, 1406. 
32. [d. at 1402. 
33. Id. at 1407. 
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In response to the plaintiff s claim for copyright infringement, the defendant argued 
that the plaintiffs labels were not copyrightable because the labels were merely 
descriptive and functional considerations dictated the form of the texe4 
Examination of the works at stake inAbli reveals that the defendant had at least 
as good a case as Roshco had in Sassafras. As an initial matter, it is hard to see how 
phrases like "50 continuous feet of beads permanently attached to nylon cord" 
exhibit any originality when they exactly describe the product being sold. Surely 
these phrases and Abli' s labels did not contain more originality than the pamphlets 
authored by Sassafras. Additionally, Abli 's suit raised the same policy concerns that 
carried the day in Sassafras, for Abli sued to disrupt a competitor's sales of beads 
and not to protect copyright incentives derived from the sale of labels. 
Despite all of this, the court decided in Abli's favor. 35 Tellingly, the court did 
not even mention the policy concerns raised by the case. Instead, the court 
apparently believed that the defendant's appropriation was an intrinsic wrong that 
had to be stopped. The court stated that "[a]ppropriation of the fruits of another's 
labor and skill in order to publish a rival work without the expenditure of the time 
and effort required for independently arrived at results is copyright infringement.,,36 
Accordingly, the court asserted that the only obstacle to copyright was the modest 
and easily met requirement of originality, and the plaintiffs victory quickly 
followed. 37 
B. The Idea/Expression Dichotomy and Commercial Information Works 
Section 1 02(b) of the copyright code denies copyright to a work's ideas.38 
Copyright contains this limitation because the public would suffer if individuals 
could own ideas. All authors borrow ideas from one another. Tfthey had to pay for 
the privilege of doing so, the creation of new works would suffer. Accordingly, 
copyright strikes a balance between the need to encourage speech through copyright 
incentives and the need to make authorship possible by leaving ideas in the public 
domain while allowing authors to claim copyright in their individual expression of 
ideas.39 
34. Id. at 1403. 
35. Jd. at 1405. 
36. Id. at 1404 (quoting Orgel v. Clark Boardman Co., 301 F.2d 119, 120 (2d Cir. 1962). 
37. Id. at 1403-04 (quoting Doran v. Sunset House Distrib. Corp., 197 F. Supp. 940, 944 (S.D. 
Cal. 1961)). Cases reaching results similar to Abli include Drop Dead Co. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, 326 
F.2d 87, 93 (9th Cir. 1963) (upholding copyright in aerosol wax label); Kitchens of Sara Lee, Inc. v. 
Nifty Foods Corp., 266 F.2d 541, 544-45 (2d Cir. 1959) (holding defendant infringed the pictures on 
plaintiffs product labels); X-IT Products, LLC v. Walter Kidde Portable Equipment, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 
2d 577, 608-11 (E.D. Va. 200 I) (holding product's box cover art is copyrightable); Sebastian Int'I, Inc. 
v. Consumer Contact (PTY) Ltd., 664 F. Supp. 909, 913 (D.N.J. 1987) (finding text on shampoo bottle 
copyrightable), rev'd on other grounds, 847 F.2d 1093, 1099 (3d Cir.1988). 
38. 17 U.S.c. § 102(b) (2000). 
39. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186,219 (2003) (explaining contrast between protection of 
expression and promotion of ideas); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 104-05 (1879) (differentiating 
between the idea of an accounting system and a particular book's expression of the proper use of the 
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The idea/expression dichotomy narrows the scope of copyright in a work by 
leaving portions of the work free for borrowing. Tn some cases, the idea/expression 
dichotomy even requires the denial of copyright to an otherwise copyrightable 
work. This happens when an idea has merged with its expression. 
An idea merges with its expression when the idea can be expressed in only a 
limited number of ways. Tn situations like this, allowing individuals to claim 
copyright in the expression of such an idea would be tantamount to allowing 
individuals to own the idea. For example, if an idea could be expressed in only 
three ways, the three people who held copyright in those expressions would 
effectively own the idea because no one else could express the idea without 
committing infringement. Courts have responded to this possibility by severely 
limiting or denying copyright to works whose ideas have merged with their 
expression.40 
The seminal case, Baker v. Selden,41 illustrates how the idea/expression 
dichotomy sometimes requires limitation of copyright in an otherwise copyrightable 
work. The Baker plaintiff owned the copyright in a book explaining a particular 
method of double-entry bookkeeping.42 The book included a number of blank forms 
that illustrated and could be used to carry out the particular method described in the 
plaintiffs book.43 The defendant also produced forms to carry out the same system 
of bookkeeping, and these forms were similar, but not identical, to the plaintiff's.44 
The plaintiff sued for copyright infringement and won in the lower courts, but the 
Supreme Court reversed.45 
The Court's decision rested on the distinction between the system of 
bookkeeping and the plaintiff's description of the system. A person could claim 
copyright in such a description, but copyright did not protect the system being 
described.46 The system therefore remained in the public domain, free for all to 
use.47 The Court worried that copyright in the plaintiffs explanation would prevent 
free use of the underlying system, and it responded by denying copyright to the 
accounting system); Computer Assocs. Int'I Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 696 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(describing "delicate equilibrium" between level of copyright that gives authors incentives to create and 
limiting such copyright to avoid stagnation from monopoly). 
40. See Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971) (holding 
the idea of jewel-encrusted "bee" pin was indistinguishable from the expression of that idea, and 
therefore there was no copyright protection for plaintiff s pin); Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 
F.2d 67S, 676, 678-79 (1st Cir. 1967) (holding the idea of distributing rules for sweepstake contest had 
merged with the expression of that idea, and therefore there was no copyright protection for plaintiffs 
rules); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 4S F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1930) (holding the abstract plot 
and characters in a play constituted ideas rather than expression, and therefore there was no copyright 
protection for plaintiffs plot and characters). 
41. 101 U.S. 99 (1879). 
42. [d. at 99-100. 
43. Jd. at 100. 
44. J d. at 100-0 1. 
4S. [d. at 100, 107. 
46. [d. at 104-0S. 
47. Jd. at lOS. 
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plaintiffs blank forms.48 
Baker v. Selden has influenced many courts to limit or deny copyright in 
commercial information works.49 For example, in Crume v. Pacific Mutual Life 
Insurance CO.,50 the plaintiff claimed copyright in four pamphlets describing the 
reorganization of insolvent insurance companies. 51 According to the plaintiffs 
complaint, the defendant published a "Rehabilitation and Reinsurance Agreement" 
that contained "many clauses, paragraphs and parts" of the plaintiffs pamphlets.52 
The plaintiff sued for copyright infringement, the district court granted the 
defendant's motion to dismiss, and the plaintiff appealed. 53 
Tn affirming the dismissal, the Seventh Circuit effectively denied copyright in 
the language borrowed by the defendant, even though the plaintiff duly copyrighted 
its pamphlets. 54 Citing Baker, the court distinguished the reorganization plans from 
the plaintiffs description of the plans. 55 The court then observed that the plaintiffs 
claim amounted to a denial of the defendant's ability to use the specific words that 
implemented the plans in question. 56 Tn situations like this, the defendant's use of 
the plaintiffs language could not amount to copyright infringement because such 
a result would give ownership of the relevant plans to the plaintiff. 57 The court 
recognized that this result effectively denied copyright in the plaintiffs works,58 but 
48. Jd. at 105-06 (quoting Clayton v. Stone, 5 F. Cas. 999,1003 (S.D.N.Y. 1829) (No. 2872»; 
see also Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'I Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 816 (1 st Cir. 1995) (applying reasoning 
from Baker to computer programs functioning as "methods of operation" and finding no copyright 
protection); Bibbero Sys., Inc. v. Colwell Sys., Inc., 893 F.2d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 1990) (denying 
copyright in medical claim forms); Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 452-54 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (describing qualities of photographs that indicate protectable originality, which must 
exist because the subject, or idea, of a photograph usually cannot be protected). 
49. See ATC Distribution Group, Inc. v. Whatever It Takes Transmissions & Parts, Inc., 402 F .3d 
700, 707-10 (6th Cir. 2005) (applying merger of idea and expression to deny copyright to a parts 
numbering and classification system and noting policy reasons for doing so); Southco, Inc. v. 
Kanebridge Corp., 390 F.3d 276, 282 (3d Cir. 2004) (parts numbers lack originality because they are 
dictated by the logic of an idea, namely the plaintiffs parts numbering system); Sassafras Enters., Inc. 
v. Roshco, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 343, 346-37 (N.D. TIL 1995) (promotional materials accompanying pizza 
stone lack originality and idea/expression dichotomy requires limitation on breadth of possible 
infringement claims by plaintiff). The Baker Court would likely have approved of these results, for it 
cited Cobbett v. Woodward, (1872) 14 L.R. Eq. 407, an English case denying copyright in drawings 
from a furniture catalog-a form of commercial information work-on the ground that the drawings 
merely depicted works for sale. Baker, 101 U.S. at 106. 
50. 140 F.2d 182 (7th Cir. 1944). 
51. Jd. at 182. 
52. Jd. at 183. 
53. Jd. at 182. 
54. Jd. at 184. 
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it could see no other reasonable course of action. 59 
On similar grounds, the District of Massachusetts, in Yankee Candle Co. v. 
Bridgewater Candle Co. ,60 denied a copyright claim by plaintiff Yankee Candle 
against its competitor. The suit involved copyright in the labels for Yankee 
Candle's popular "Housewarmer" line of candles.61 These rectangular labels 
contained the Yankee Candle name at the top and "Housewarmer" at the bottom.62 
The labels also depicted the scent ofthe candles in question with a photograph and 
the name of the fragrance. 63 Thus, a eucalyptus scented candle would have a label 
depicting eucalyptus leaves.64 In 1998, Bridgewater began marketing a competing 
line of candles with labels that depicted the scent of the candles with Bridgewater's 
own photographs and the name of the fragrance. 6s Yankee Candle objected and 
sued for, among other things, copyright infringement. 66 The court granted summary 
judgment for Bridgewater on the copyright claim.67 
The court reasoned thatthe ideas behind the Yankee Candle labels merged with 
their expression.68 Tn the court's opinion, very few ways existed for depicting 
cinnamon or other fragrances. 69 Yankee Candle therefore had no cause of action for 
copyright against Bridgewater unless Bridgewater's photographs were practically 
identical to Yankee Candle's.70 Such similarity did not exist, so Yankee Candle's 
claim had to fail. 71 
For purposes of contrast, consider FMC Corp. v. Control Solutions, Inc.,n a 
case that demonstrates how courts sometimes reach results inconsistent with Crume 
and Yankee Candle. Tn FMC, the plaintiff and defendant were competitors selling 
essentially the same pesticide. 73 FMC, the plaintiff, marketed the pesticide first 
under a patent.74 That marketing involved the use of a product label whose general 
contents were partially required by the federal government.7S After the patent 
59. [d. at 184-85 C'To hold that an idea, plan, method or art described in a copyright is open to 
the public but that it can be used only by the employment of different words and phrases which mean 
the same thing, borders on the preposterous. It is to exalt the accomplishment of a result by indirect 
means which could not be done directly. It places a premium upon evasion and makes this the test of 
infringement. Notwithstanding some authorities which support a theory permitting such a result, we 
think it is wrong and disapprove it."). 
60. 99 F. Supp. 2d 140 (D. Mass. 2000). 
61. [d. at 143. 
62. [d. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 148. 
65. [d. at 143. 
66. [d. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 144-45. 
69. [d. 
70. [d. at 146. 
71. Id. at 147-50. 
72. 369 F. Supp. 2d 539 (E.D. Pa. 2005). 
73. [d. at 542. 
74. [d. at 545. 
75. Id. at 543. 
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expired, the defendant Control Solutions began selling a generic version of the 
formerly patented pesticide.76 Control Solutions also had to include a product label 
with the same required information that FMC had provided, and it complied by 
copying FMC's label. 77 FMC objected to this and sued for infringement. 78 
Control Solutions had a very plausible argument for merger of idea and 
expression. The required information for the product labels included information 
about hazards and directions for use, identification of the pests against which the 
pesticides were effective, and the application and mixing rates of the pesticides for 
many uses.79 Many expressions of such information may exist, but relatively few 
would effectively convey the necessary information in a concise manner. TfFMC 
gained one or more copyrights that forced competitors to use less effective labels, 
it would gain competitive advantages of the sort not contemplated by copyright. 
Competitors forced to use less effective language might not receive government 
approval to sell the pesticide, or their less effective warnings might increase their 
exposure to product liability suits. And, of course, competitors who wanted to use 
FMC's language would wind up paying a license fee that would serve as a de facto 
royalty for a previously patented product now in the public domain. 
Despite this, the court found no merger. 80 It correctly noted that the issue was 
whether the label's ideas could be expressed in many ways,81 but it did not consider 
that many possible expressions of the label's ideas would not effectively express 
the ideas. This had the effect of multiplying significantly the number of available 
expressions for the ideas, and the possibility of multiple expressions thus removed 
any concerns about merger. 82 Additionally, the court seemed unconcerned about the 
possibly anti-competitive effects of giving FMC copyright, for it characterized the 
merger of idea and expression as a "somewhat metaphysical issue" umelated to 
commerce and competition.83 
The divergent results of Sassafras, Abli, Crume, Yankee Candle, and FMC 
expose the disagreement over the treatment of copyright in commercial information 
works. The five cases shared many important similarities. All involved commercial 
information works and plaintiffs who sued not for the purpose of protecting 
copyright incentives for the creation of their works, but to hinder the lawful 
marketing of a competitor's products. Deciding these cases in the plaintiffs' favor 
therefore meant harming the public interest through the disruption of properly 
76. Id. 
77. Jd. at 543, 549. 
78. Jd. at 553. 
79. Id. at 543. 
80. Id. at 556. 
81. Jd. at 566 (citing Dymow v. Bolton, II F .2d 690, 691 (2d Cir. 1926)). 
82. Jd. at 567. 
83. Id. ("Understandably, CSI may well wish to demonstrate to its potential customers that its 
product is identical in makeup and applications as TalstarOne, however, 'that is a commercial and 
competitive objective which does not enter into the somewhat metaphysical issue of whether particular 
ideas and expressions have merged. m( quoting Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 
F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir. 1983»). 
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functioning markets. The Sassafras, Crume, and Yankee Candle courts understood 
this, and they refused to go along with the plaintiffs' claims. However, theAbli and 
FMC courts seemed uninterested in these policy issues, and they reached very 
different results. 
Both sides of this disagreement have plausible support for their positions. 
Obviously those who favor the Sassafras, Crume, and Yankee Candle position 
would point to the negative consequences of extending copyright to commercial 
information works. Those rejecting that position would argue that doctrinal 
interpretations necessary to limit copyright in commercial information works would 
have negative consequences in other parts of copyright. If courts want to limit 
copyright in commercial information works, they will have to interpret the 
copyright doctrine in a way that resolves doubts about copyrightability against 
plaintiffs. While this might be a good idea for commercial information works, 
courts would have to do the same thing for other works because copyright has no 
doctrinal basis for treating commercial information works and other works 
separately. This would mean denying copyright to some works, perhaps computer 
programs or compilations of information, that should perhaps be copyrighted in 
order to ensure their continued production.84 
The foregoing shows that conflict over copyright in commercial information 
works amounts to disagreement about singling commercial information works out 
for the kind oftreatment to which other works might not be subject. Those favoring 
limited copyright see no problem with making the suggested distinction, while 
those taking the opposite position question its possibility and wisdom. This 
seemingly intractable disagreement sets the stage for this Essay's inquiry about 
wisdom the First Amendment may provide. 
TIT. THE FIRST AMENDMENT'S SPECIAL TREATMENT OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH 
The distinct First Amendment jurisprudence of commercial speech began in the 
case of Valentine v. Chrestensen. 85 In that case, Chrestensen owned and exhibited 
for profit an old United States Navy submarine.86 Chrestensen discovered that his 
attempted distribution ofthe handbill advertising the ship violated a local ordinance 
prohibiting distribution in the streets of commercial and business advertisements.87 
84. The outline of this argument appears in FMC. Recall that the FMC court did not interpret the 
idea/expression dichotomy with much concern for overbroad copyright. Instead, the court cited the case 
of Apple Computer, in which the Third Circuit resolved doubts about the copyrightability of operating 
system software in favor of the plaintiff Apple Computer. FMC, 369 F. Supp. 2d at 566--67 (citing 
Apple Computer, 714 F .2d at 1240, 1245). Finally, the court asserted that extending copyright to FMC 
served the public interest because FMC's investment deserved protection.ld. at 578. This assertion was, 
in candor, rather dubious. As noted earlier, FMC surely did not need the protection of copyright to have 
sufficient incentive for creating the label in question. Accordingly, the court's assertion about the public 
interest can best be understood as an argument that copyright best serves the public interest by resolving 
doubts about copyrightability in favor of copyright. 
85. 3 16 U.S. 52 (1942). 
86. Jd. at 52. 
87. Id. at 53. 
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Christensen then created a handbill that displayed an advertisement for the 
submarine on one side and a protest against the ordinance on the other.88 The police 
told Christensen that his handbill still violated the ordinance, but that a handbill 
displaying only the protest would not.89 Christensen distributed the handbills 
anyway, and the police stopped him.90 Chrestensen sued, alleging violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.91 He prevailed in both the District Court and Circuit Court 
of Appeals,92 but the Supreme Court reversed.93 
In reversing, the Court stated that "the streets are proper places for the exercise 
of the freedom of communicating information," and that government may not 
unduly burden free speech in public places.94 However, the Court also stated that 
the Constitution imposed "no such restraint" with respect to "purely commercial 
advertising.,,95 The Court understood that one side of Chrestensen's handbill 
communicated something besides advertising. However, the Court worried that 
deciding in Chrestensen's favor would effectively destroy the law because 
circumvention would become easy.96 
Valentine suggested that "purely commercial advertising" receives no First 
Amendment protection at all, but later courts have not interpreted the First 
Amendment so narrowly. Instead, they have held thatthe First Amendment protects 
commercial speech, but to a lesser extent than other "ordinary" speech.97 In the 
leading case of Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council, Inc., 98 the Supreme Court explained why the First Amendment offers less 
protection to commercial speech. The case involved a consumer challenge to the 
constitutionality of a law providing that pharmacists committed "unprofessional 
conduct" by advertising the price or amount of prescriptions drugs.99 According to 
the Court, the law effectively prohibited such advertisement. 100 Not surprisingly, the 
defendant-appellant Virginia State Board of Pharmacy contended that the First 
Amendment did not protect commercial speech.lOl The Court disagreed and 




91. [d. at 54. 
92. [d. 
93. Id. at 55. 
94. Id. at 54. 
95. [d. 
96. [d. at 55. 
97. See 44 Liquorrnart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 502 (1996); Cincinnati v. Discovery 
Network, 507 U.S. 410, 422 (1993); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Servo Comm'n, 447 U.S. 
557,562--63 (1980); Va. State Bd. ofPhannacyv. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 
772 & n.24 (1976). 
98. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
99. Id. at 749-50. 
100. [d. at 752. 
101. [d. at 758. 
102. Id. at 759. 
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Court noted that advertisers do not lose First Amendment protection simply because 
they speak to earn money.103 Moreover, the Court considered commercial speech 
indispensable to a free market economy and consideration of how to regulate or 
modify such an economy.104 The Court therefore held that the First Amendment 
protects commercial speech. I os 
This did not mean, however, that the First Amendment protected commercial 
speech as vigorously as other speech. The Court identified some "commonsense 
differences between speech that does 'no more than propose a commercial 
transaction' and other varieties.,,106 First, disseminators of commercial speech can 
verity the truth oftheir statements with relative ease. I 07 Second, commercial speech 
"may be more durable than other kinds.,,108 The Court considered these 
characteristics significant because they affected the likelihood that commercial 
speech needed full First Amendment protection to flourish. l09 
Tn the case of ordinary speech, the First Amendment prohibits government from 
suppressing speech it deems false because such regulation creates a "chilling 
effect."llo Speakers do not know if they will face prosecution because it is often 
difficult to ascertain the truth of controversial statements. Speakers become risk-
averse to the possibility of prosecution because they worry that courts will 
mistakenly find their speech false orthatthey themselves will unintentionally speak 
falsely. Such risk aversion means that some speakers who would otherwise speak 
the truth refrain from speaking at all, and the loss of such truthful speech harms 
public discourse. The First Amendment remedies this problem by prohibiting 
government from suppressing false speech with impunity. II I When speakers realize 
that government cannot prosecute them simply because their speech is false, they 
become more willing to speak. In short, the First Amendment requires that 
government tolerate at least some false speech to ensure the dissemination of true 
speech.ll2 
103. Jd. at 762. 
104. Jd. at 765 ("Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem, is 
nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is producing and selling what product, for what 
reason, and at what price. So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the 
allocation of our resources in large measure will be made through numerous private economic decisions. 
It is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. 
To this end, the free flow of commercial information is indispensable. And ifit is indispensable to the 
proper allocation of resources in a free enterprise system, it is also indispensable to the formation of 
intelligent opinions as to how that system ought to be regulated or altered." (citations omitted)). 
105. [d. at 770. 
106. [d. at 771 n.24 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 




110. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 300-01 (1964) (Goldberg, J., 
concurring). 
Ill. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 269-70, 279-80; Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323, 
339-40 (1974). 
112. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 271-72,278-79; Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340-41. 
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By contrast, there is little risk of such chill when the government prohibits false 
commercial speech. As an initial matter, commercial speakers know if they speak 
the truth, for they have accurate information about the goods and services that they 
sell. This implies that commercial speakers worry less about being mistakenly 
prosecuted than ordinary speakers because neither they nor the government will 
likely err about the legality of commercial speech. Additionally, commercial 
speakers will probably quickly overcome any chilling effect that may exist because 
commercial imperatives give speakers particularly strong reasons to speak. I 13 Thus, 
there are fewer reasons to avoid suppressing false commercial speech for fear of 
silencing speakers, 114 and this led the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy Court to 
conclude that government could freely prohibit false or misleading commercial 
speech. I IS 
IV. A COMMERCIAL SPEECH PERSPECTIVE ON COPYRIGHT IN COMMERCIAL 
INFORMATION WORKS 
The jurisprudence of commercial speech affects copyright in commercial 
information works in three ways. First, it supports a distinction between 
commercial information works and other works in copyright. Remember that the 
case for not limiting copyright in commercial information works rests in part on 
concerns that courts cannot single such works out for special treatment. However, 
if courts do this in First Amendment cases, it seems entirely reasonable for courts 
to do likewise in copyright cases. 
Second, it weakens the justification for granting copyright in commercial 
information works. In cases explaining why copyright is constitutional, the 
Supreme Court has clearly operated on the belief that copyright's economic 
incentives significantly encourage the production of speech.116 The importance of 
this belief can hardly be understated. If society does not have significantly more 
speech with copyright than without, the Court would find it difficult to describe 
copyright as pro-speech. In short, copyright's constitutionality rests on the 
assumption that significant amounts of speech would not exist but for copyright. 
Things are very different for commercial speech. In Virginia State Board of 
Pharmacy, the Court observed that commercial speech is a hardy form of speech 
that will likely flourish even when regulated. ll7 If commercial speech exists 
primarily to stimulate commercial interest in goods or services, then commercial 
speakers communicate with the expectation of profiting from the sale of those 
goods or services. To the extent that money motivates and enables speech, 
commercial speech has plenty of motivation behind it, and government regulation 
113. See Va. State Ed. a/Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24. 
114. Jd. 
115. Jd. at 771-73. 
116. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186,219 (2003) (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. 
v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)) (copyright's purpose is to promote creation of new works). 
117. 425 U.S. at 772 n.24. 
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will have relatively little effect on its existence.118 This observation has huge 
implications for copyright in commercial information works, for ifpeople already 
have strong motives for creating them, it is highly unlikely that copyright is 
necessary to encourage their production. This strengthens the case for denying or 
limiting copyright in commercial information works because society has little to 
gain from copyright in those works.119 
Third, the jurisprudence of commercial speech identifies reasons that society 
would want people to repeat commercial information works and commit what 
would otherwise be infringement. In Eldred, the Supreme Court stated that once a 
person has created and disseminated speech, society has little to gain by having 
another person repeat the message. 120 Accordingly, to the extent that copyright 
limits those who copy the speech of others, the Court could safely minimize the 
First Amendment significance of that suppression. 
Here too, things are different with respect to commercial information works. 
The Virginia State Board of Pharmacy Court noted that commercial speech gets 
First Amendment protection because of the role it plays in disseminating 
information to the public in our marketplace economy.l2l Thus, if a person sells 
goods identical to those sold by a competitor, the public needs to know; there is a 
First Amendment interest in ensuring dissemination of that information as long as 
the speaker does not deceive the public. 
This observation affects copyright in commercial information works because 
plaintiffs generally assert copyright in those works to disrupt the commercial 
messages of competitors. TheAbli plaintiff objected because he did not want others 
to know that the defendant was selling the same beads. 122 Similarly, the FMC 
plaintiff sued to force the defendant to change informative messages placed in the 
defendant's pesticide labels. 123 Tn both of these cases, the free dissemination ofthe 
defendants' messages would have served the public interest by informing the public 
about the characteristics of the goods for sale. This is the very reason that the First 
Amendment values commercial speech, and it runs counter to the conventional 
assertion that repeated messages have little constitutional value. Moreover, when 
combined with the observation that commercial information works will be created 
in the absence of copyright incentives, it strengthens the case for limiting copyright 
in those works because the public has more to gain from the copying and 
118. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Servo Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564, n.6 (1980); Va. 
State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772, n.24. 
119. See Lisa P. Ramsey, Intellectual Property Rights in Advertising, 12 MICH. TELEcoMM. & 
TECH. L. REv. 189,217-23 (2006) (noting that copyright incentives do little to encourage production 
of advertisements because parties recoup the cost of production through the sales of other goods or 
services). 
120. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221 ("[The First Amendment] bears less heavily when speakers 
assert the right to make other people's speeches."). 
121. 425 U.S. at 765. 
122. See Abli, Inc. V. Standard Brands Paint Co., 323 F. Supp. 1400, 1402--03 (C.D. Cal. 1970). 
123. See FMC Corp. v. Control Solutions, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 2d 539, 542-43, 543 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 
2005). 
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dissemination of commercial information works than it does from copyrighting 
them. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Essay explains how the First Amendment jurisprudence of commercial 
speech strengthens the case for limiting copyright in commercial information works 
when plaintiffs sue to disrupt the nonmisleading commercial messages of 
competitors. However, there is plenty of work to do before these suggestions 
become firm conclusions. 
Some of the problems are definitional and conceptual. This Essay considers 
commercial information works because their purpose of conveying basic 
commercial information is similar to the Supreme Court's definition of commercial 
speech as "speech that does 'no more than propose a commercial transaction. ",124 
By doing so, the influence of commercial speech jurisprudence on copyright 
becomes clear. But what happens when courts confront the messy reality that some 
works will convey basic commercial information about goods or services while also 
providing entertainment of the sort associated with movies?125 
For example, consider advertisements of the sort made by Volkswagen to 
promote its GTl automobile. 126 These ads do much more than convey basic 
information about Volkswagens, for they also offer stylized, image-oriented 
entertainment. When compared to cases like Sassafrass, Crume, Yankee Candle, 
AbU, and FMC, it is much harder to say that the advertisements lack originality or 
that their ideas merge with their expression. Nevertheless, it also seems quite likely 
thatthese works would exist without copyright's incentives. Should courts therefore 
interpret the law to limit copyright in these works? 
While it might be tempting to answer questions like this in the affirmative, this 
Essay chooses to leave its resolution for another day. Concepts like originality and 
the idea/expression dichotomy may be slippery, but that does not preclude the 
existence of works like the Volkswagen advertisements whose copyrightability 
seems clear as a matter of doctrine. The policy observations associated with 
commercial speechjurisprudence obviously raise provocative questions about the 
wisdom of continuing to protect works like these with copyright, but it seems 
premature to definitively conclude that copyright should not protect such works. 
Other questions will arise as contexts change. For example, what happens when 
the plaintiff has produced a commercial information work and the defendant has 
124. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human 
Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)). 
125. This problem corresponds to ambiguity in the definition of commercial speech itself See 
Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627, 639-48 
(1990) (discussing examples of commercial speech that do more than propose a commercial 
transaction). 
126. See GTI MkV, http://www.vw.com/gti/en/us/# (last visited May 22, 2007) (allowing visitors 
to the advertisement to view photos, take a 3600 tour of the car, and watch commercials and videos of 
the product). 
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used the plaintiffs work in a work that is "regular" speech? In situations like this, 
one might argue that the case for limiting copyright becomes even stronger because 
the First Amendment implications of suppressing the defendant's speech are more 
serious than those associated with cases in which the defendant produces only a 
commercial information work. Such policy, if ultimately accepted, could greatly 
affect application of doctrines not considered in this Essay, such as fair use, perhaps 
through determinations made about the nature of the copyrighted work and the 
effect on the market for the copyrighted work.127 
Similarly, what happens ifthe plaintiffhas produced a regular, noncommercial 
work, and the defendant has produced a commercial information work? It may be 
appropriate to strongly enforce copyright in cases like this because the commercial 
nature of the defendant's work lowers the First Amendment concerns over its 
suppression. This might influence the fair use interpretation of the purpose for the 
borrowing, and it may explain the existing pro-plaintiff implications of a finding 
that a defendant's use is for commercial purposes. 128 
Finally, it is interesting to consider the impact of commercial speech 
jurisprudence in cases beyond commercial speech. If observations about the 
hardiness of speech and the importance of its repetition suggest limiting copyright 
in commercial information works, perhaps similar conclusions follow for other 
types of speech. F or example, copyright presently protects works authored by state 
governments. 129 However, those works probably do not need copyright incentives 
to assure their production, and society has a very strong interest in their free 
reproduction and dissemination. Taxes, not copyright revenues, support state 
reports about polluted rivers or laws created by state legislatures, and the public 
ought to receive these reports freely. Given Congress's failure to deny copyright to 
such works, it may be impossible to completely prevent state attempts to copyright 
them. However, it would seem quite sensible to apply the fair use doctrine 
vigorously on behalf of defendants who copy and disseminate such works. 
Unfortunately, limitations of space and time prevent this Essay from exploring 
these issues adequately. Nevertheless, it is hoped that the Essay has shown that the 
First Amendment jurisprudence of commercial speech raises important points about 
copyright law and can help courts interpret the law to society'S advantage. 
127. This could happen in a number of interesting scenarios. A social critic might write a book 
about the effect of advertisements and include reproductions to illustrate her point. Alternatively, a 
movie maker might include a commercial information work as part of a movie's scenery. 
128. See 17 U.S.c. § I 07( I) (2000) (making the applicability of fair use partially dependent on 
whether a defendant's use is for a commercial purpose); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 
569,578-79 (1994) (noting commercial purpose is one of several relevant factors to consider in the 
analysis of fair use and is not dispositive). 
129. Copyright explicitly excludes federal works from protection, but not state works. 17 U.S.C. 
§ 105 (2000). 
